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Abstract—The emerging blockchain protocols provide a de-
centralized architecture that is suitable of supporting Internet
of Things (IoT) interactions. However, keeping a local copy of
the blockchain ledger is infeasible for low-power and memory-
constrained devices. For this reason, they are equipped with
lightweight software implementations that only download the
useful data structures, e.g. state of accounts, from the blockchain
network, when they are updated. In this paper, we consider
and analyze a novel scheme, implemented by the nodes of the
blockchain network, which aggregates the blockchain data in
periodic updates and further reduces the communication cost of
the connected IoT devices. We show that the aggregation period
should be selected based on the channel quality, the offered rate,
and the statistics of updates of the useful data structures. The
results, obtained for the Ethereum protocol, illustrate the benefits
of the aggregation scheme in terms of a reduced duty cycle of
the device, particularly for low signal-to-noise ratios, and the
overall reduction of the amount of information transmitted in
downlink (e.g., from the wireless base station to the IoT device).
A potential application of the proposed scheme is to let the IoT
device request more information than actually needed, hence
increasing its privacy, while keeping the communication cost
constant. In conclusion, our work is the first to provide rigorous
guidelines for the design of lightweight blockchain protocols with
wireless connectivity.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, data structures, blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE the advent of the Bitcoin protocol in 2008 [1], alarge wave of blockchain protocols has emerged, aiming
to support the implementation of decentralized applications, or
dApps, that reduce the need of a central authority to supervise
the interactions in multi-agent systems [2]. A promising use
of dApps is in the Internet of Things (IoT) services, e.g. for
executing economic transactions in smart grid applications
in which devices interact through a blockchain to trade en-
ergy [3], [4] or to solve distributed optimizations [5].
Storing the entire blockchain and processing every trans-
action require a remarkable amount of storage memory and
computations. This is not feasible for IoT devices, as they
are often constrained with respect to memory, computation,
communication and power. Instead, the IoT devices may act as
lightweight clients, which only store a subset of the blockchain
data, possibly encoded [6], needed to verify certain events of
interest. The IoT devices, configured as lightweight clients,
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Fig. 1. Communication architecture for the interaction of IoT devices with a
set of blockchain nodes (BNs) via wireless links provided by a base station
(BS).
are connected to a set of regular blockchain nodes (BNs),
e.g. via a wireless base station, see Fig. 1. These devices
are constantly synchronizing with the BNs [7], receiving a
minimal amount of information, namely the block headers. In
addition, when certain events that are of interest to a specific
device occur, e.g. modification of specific accounts’ state or
transactions involving these accounts, the BNs transmit the
updates to the device, including the proof of their inclusion
(PoIs) in the blockchain.
While the architecture with lightweight clients reduces the
processing and memory requirements, there is still a need for
a remarkable amount of downlink traffic in order to maintain
synchronization to the global blockchain [7]. This type of
operation challenges the common assumption that IoT devices
mostly generate uplink traffic [8], [9], urging the investigation
in accurate models for blockchain traffic. Schemes that reduce
the amount of traffic exchanged between the lightweight
clients and the BNs have previously been proposed, either by
modifying the block structure [10], [11], by leveraging on the
characteristics of account-based blockchains, e.g. Ethereum
[12], or by backing the authenticity of the transmitted infor-
mation with a deposit of credit [13], [14].
This work is motivated by the observation that the
blockchain synchronization process can be tailored to the
actual requirements of timely information updates to the IoT
devices. That is, the ultimate target is not to keep the devices
always synchronized, but to synchronize them according to the
needs of the underlying dApp. Hence, we replace the legacy
scheme, in which the BNs transmits the information to the
devices whenever available, with a novel approach in which
the information is accumulated and pushed only when needed
by the end IoT devices. Among the multitude of blockchain
protocols, we focus on the Ethereum specification [15], but
the overall principle of aggregation can be applied to other
“account-based” blockchains.
The contributions of this work can be summarized as
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Fig. 2. Example structure of a blockchain. h(x) is the hash value of node x and | | is the concatenation operation. The t transactions included in block b
apply modifications to the accounts’ states, which are stored in a database. The state tree depicted on the righthand side, ternary in this example, is build
from this database, and its root included in the block header. Branch nodes are colored in blue and extension nodes in brown. Leaf nodes (there are eight of
them in the example) are composed by key and value, and colored in green.
follows:
1) We propose and analyze an aggregation scheme, imple-
mented at the BNs, that reduces the duty cycle of the
device and the amount of transferred data, at the cost
of an increased information delay at the IoT device.
The reduction is achieved when events of interests to
the device occur multiple times within an aggregation
period, and is mainly caused by avoiding transmission of
temporary states, but also because the size of the proof
of inclusion increases sublinearly with the number of
events.
2) We extend our previous model [7] by including the
possibility for the IoT device to observe multiple ac-
counts, and for the base station to select the transmission
rate. The result is a model for lightweight clients that
is rich, but simple to analyze. We show its potential
application by constructing a set of observed accounts
that increases the privacy of the IoT device, while
keeping the communication cost low.
3) We study the cost of transmitting the proof of inclu-
sion for the updated data, namely the Merkle-Patricia
tree data structures, and provide experimental results
obtained for Ethereum protocol.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides an introduction to blockchain protocols, fo-
cusing on Ethereum, and describes the lightweight protocol
variants. The system model is introduced in Section III and
analyzed in Section IV. Section V presents the evaluation and
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOL
This section introduces the main components of the
Ethereum protocol [15], that is a popular choice for blockchain
systems tailored for IoT applications [3], [16], [17]. The
common trait of Ethereum with other blockchain protocols
can be found in [18].
The Ethereum blockchain is a database that records of his-
tory of the states of accounts in a chain of blocks. An account
is a data structure that contains an amount of credit and a
general-purpose memory block. The account may also contain
a set of predefined procedures that can read and write to the
memory; in this case, the account is called smart contract.
The state of an account can be changed by transactions, either
directly or through the invocation of a procedure in a smart
contract. We shall refer to these modifications of accounts as
events.
Transactions are signed by devices using an asymmetric
cipher, and identified by their hash values1, as in the Bitcoin
specification [1]. The transactions are organized in a chain
of blocks. Besides a set of transactions, each block contains
cryptographic signatures of the current states of the accounts
and a pointer to the preceding block in the chain, which
defines a causal relationship between blocks. When a block
is appended to the blockchain, the transactions that it includes
are considered valid.
The Ethereum database is replicated at multiple nodes that
are interconnected by a communication network. Each node
can append new blocks to the blockchain and inform the rest
of the network about a new state of the database. To avoid
uncontrolled generation of blocks, so as to keep the database
replications consistent, the nodes establish a leader election
mechanism that (i) reduces the probability that more than one
node generates a valid block at the same time and (ii) keeps the
block generation rate lower than the propagation delay of the
communication network. Notable examples of leader election
mechanisms in blockchains are Proof of Work [1] and Proof of
Stake [19]. In order for a block to be considered valid, it must
provide information that can be used to verify that it has been
generated in accordance with the leader election mechanism.
A. The block data structure
A block is composed of a header and a body, see Fig. 2.
The block header has a fixed size, while the rest of the block
contains the actual transactions and has a variable size. When
the number of transactions in a block is high, the variable-
size part takes a dominant portion of the total block size. The
information specified in the header includes: the block hash
value, an incremental counter, the cryptographic signature of
the node that generated it, the proof that the block is valid,
e.g., Proof of Work solution, and one or more hash values that
1The hash value of some input data x is the output of a hash function
defined by the blockchain protocol, and is indicated as h(x).
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Fig. 3. Representation of the PoIs (a) of node 4, (b) of node 8 of Fig. 2, and
(c) PoMI of 4 and 8. h(x) is the hash value of x and | | is the concatenation
operation.
represent roots of PoI trees. In this work, we mainly consider
the transactions tree and the state tree. The transactions tree,
which uniquely binds the modifications of accounts certified
by a block with the block header, can be used to prove that
specific transactions are included in the block. The state tree,
depicted on the right-hand side of Fig. 2, provides a snapshot
of the entire collection of account states.2
B. Proof of inclusion (PoI) via Merkle-Patricia trees
The Ethereum protocol provides PoIs using Merkle-Patricia
trees [15], [20], [21]. A Merkle-Patricia tree has three types
of nodes; leaf, extension and branch nodes, see Fig. 2, as in
standard Patricia trees [22], and is used to efficiently store
and retrieve data structures associated with strings. In the
blockchain context, the string is the hash value of the address
of an account or transaction, and the data structure to be
retrieved is the account/transaction itself. The branch nodes
only store the hash value of the list of its child nodes, see
Fig. 2. Leaf and extension nodes, also illustrated in Fig. 2,
store a key, that is the hash value of the common path shared
by all child nodes, and a value. The value stored by extension
nodes is the hash value of the list of child nodes, and the one
of the leaf nodes is the hash value of the data that is to be
authenticated (e.g. an account or transaction). The use of a
hash function to index the addresses provides equal length of
the strings, which are equiprobable.
The presence of a specific node in the Merkle-Patricia tree
is proven by constructing its PoI. A PoI is a collection of node
values that enables generation of the hash value, contained by
the root node of the tree, e.g. the node labeled 0 in Fig. 2,
starting from the specific node to prove. By comparing the
generated root hash value with the value stored in the block
header, the inclusion in the blockchain of the data structure,
associated with the specific node, can be verified [1]. In
practice, the PoI is used to verify that a particular leaf node, i.e.
an account or transaction, is present in a state tree. Specifically,
a PoI is created by starting from the root of the Merkle-Patricia
tree, and descending to the specific node. At each level, all
nodes, that are siblings to the node on the path from the root
to the specific node, are collected, as illustrated in Fig. 3 ((a)
and (b)). Notice that a PoI, in general, contains much fewer
nodes than the complete Merkle-Patricia tree since most of
2The state tree is a characteristic of the Ethereum specification.
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Fig. 4. Information exchanged between a client and a BN using a lightweight
protocol during four block periods, (a) without aggregation scheme and (b)
with aggregation. Downlink/uplink messages are depicted above/below the
time arrow. “Data of interest” includes the accounts’ data and relative PoMIs.
the branches are not collected during the descent from the
root [21].
A single proof can be constructed to prove multiple data
structures by collecting the union of the nodes required to
prove each of the data structures. We shall refer to such a proof
as a Proof of Multiple Inclusions (PoMI)3. Since the nodes
required to prove each data structure are likely to intersect, a
PoMI is typically much smaller than if each data structure is to
be proven by an individual PoI. Fig. 3(c) provides an example
of this reduction, for the proof of both nodes 4 and 8. If two
individual proofs are build, the PoI of node 4 contains nodes
{5, 2, 3} and the PoI of node 8 contains {1, 2, 6, 7}, such
that seven nodes are needed in total. However, if the proofs are
sent together in a PoMI, only nodes {2, 5, 6, 7} are needed,
motivating the advantage of using this data structure.
C. Synchronization protocols
A blockchain client is updated on modifications of the
blockchain database, observed by BNs, by means of a synchro-
nization protocol. In [7] we have presented three possible pro-
tocols that can be adopted for this purpose, denoted by P1, P2
and P3. With P1, the client itself stores the entire blockchain,
and locally checks the correctness of the transactions. This
configuration is not envisaged for IoT devices due to the
requirements of storage memory and processing, and will not
be considered in this work. In P2, the BNs are notified about
the account updates that the client is interested in receiving.
Hence, the client receives the block headers from the BNs,
by default, and the accounts of interest, only when they are
modified. This scheme, referred to as a lightweight protocol,
reduces the amount of data communicated in the downlink,
as well as the amount of local processing. In fact, the client
only verifies that the information sent by BNs is consistent,
delegating to them the auditing of the actual validity of the
transactions [21]. It follows that, with P2, the client must be
connected to at least one honest BN to be able to detect the
presence of false information. Finally, in protocol P3 the IoT
device is connected to a proxy node that only sends to the
device the useful information, without providing any proof
that is included in the blockchain. This protocol is also not
considered in this work, as it requires the device to fully
3In contrast with prior literature [20], we use the terms PoI and PoMI to
differentiate the proof from the blockchain-specific data structure that provides
it, e.g. Merkle tree (in Bitcoin) or Merkle-Patricia tree (in Ethereum).
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trust the proxy node, which is not in line with the envisioned
trustless decentralized architecture.
In this paper, we assume that the IoT devices have memory
and processing limitations and only consider the lightweight
protocols of type P2, such as Bitcoin’s Simplified Payment
Verification (SPV) [1] and the Ethereum Light Client [23],
which are designed to allow clients to verify the inclusion of
transactions in the blockchain without downloading and stor-
ing the entire blockchain. Specifically, clients only download
block headers, as well as the data structures (e.g. account or
transaction data structures) that are of interest.
Fig. 4 shows the messages exchanged between a client and
a BN using a lightweight protocol during three block periods.
The red crosses represent the instants at which new blocks
are generated. In the basic lightweight protocol, Fig. 4(a), the
information is pushed in the downlink from BS as it becomes
available. In the first block period there is no information of
interest, and only the block header is sent, while in the second
and third periods there are events of interest and the respective
data are sent with their PoMI.
The presence of both transactions and state tree roots in
the Ethereum block headers, see Fig. 2, permits to adopt two
different approaches to update the local copy of the account
states, as illustrated with the following example. Suppose that
an account is updated multiple times during several block
periods. The BN can send the last version of the account
data, with the corresponding partition of state tree at the last
block. In this case, the IoT device just replaces the local data
if the PoI root matches the one included in the last block
header, otherwise refuses it, cf. [12], [20]. Alternatively, the
BNs send the whole sequence of transactions that modified the
account, along the block periods, together with the collection
of their PoIs build from the transactions tree. The sequence
of transactions is applied, by the device, to its local version of
the account state, to finally reconstruct the updated state. In
this paper, we only consider the first approach, and we remark
the extension to the second one in Sec. V-D.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The scheme proposed in this paper aggregates the informa-
tion in order to reduce the communication cost, see Fig. 4(b).
Given that the application run by the client can tolerate a delay,
information is accumulated at the BN and then periodically
released at the subsequent aggregation point. The approach
followed by the BN is to always send a proof by means of the
state tree, triggering the replacement of the local copy of the
client. This permits to send only the latest version of accounts
that are modified multiple times during the accumulation, and
merge the PoIs of accounts modified in different blocks, in a
unique PoMI. The scheme is investigated in detail in the rest
of the paper.
A. Blockchain network and IoT device
We consider a blockchain network in which new blocks are
generated at exponentially distributed intervals with (network-
wide) rate λ. A single IoT device is connected to a set of N
BNs via a wireless link through a base station, see Fig. 1. The
device subscribes to block headers for all generated blocks
as well as state updates for a set A of accounts, which
are a subset of the existing accounts. The generic account,
indexed as j ∈ N, is updated independently in a block with
probability (or relative frequency) pj . We consider the case
where the device is not interested in the full state history
of the observed accounts, but merely in their most recent
state. That is, the device needs to be informed about only the
most recent state of the observed accounts, as well as receive
the PoMI that proves the inclusion of the specific account
states in the blockchain. The case is representative of a class
of problems in which the age of the information, i.e. data
freshness, is more valuable than tracking all state changes,
and includes environmental monitoring applications and power
grid stabilization systems [24].
To simplify the presentation, we assume that a block header
and updated accounts’ states take up a fixed number of lH and
la bits, respectively. In contrast with this, the size of the PoMI,
with length lPoMI bits, is random as a result of the PoMI tree
data structure. Specifically, as described in Section II, the size
of the PoMI is sublinear in the number of accounts.
B. Aggregation protocol
The block headers and the updated observed accounts are
aggregated at a BN, termed aggregation BN, selected by the
device, and transmitted to the device periodically every T
seconds. The value of T depends on the information delay, tol-
erated by the application, from the instant at which the account
is modified, to the instant at which the update is delivered
to the device. Upon successful reception of the transmission,
the IoT device acknowledges the packet. We assume that the
device selects the sequence of aggregation BNs, over different
aggregation period, as part of the initial network association
procedure, e.g. by means of a seed sequence. Consequently,
the execution of the protocol only requires downlink messages,
because all the information, needed by BNs, is sent by the
IoT device in the initialization phase. When no transmission
is ongoing, the device is assumed to be in power-saving mode.
C. Wireless link
The wireless downlink from the base station to the IoT
device is assumed to be a block Rayleigh-fading channel with
constant channel gain over the duration of a transmission and
independent channel gains across transmissions. This occurs,
for example, in system based on per-packet frequency hopping
(FH). Due to the power constraints of the IoT device, we
assume that the base station has no information about the
channel and hence performs no power or rate adaptation. As
a result, a transmission may fail with probability [25]
pout = 1 − exp
(
−2
R
W − 1
γ
)
, (1)
where γ is the average received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR),
R is the transmission rate in bits/s, W is the bandwidth of the
channel in Hz. The downlink packet is retransmitted until it
has been received successfully by the device.
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Fig. 5. The periodic release of information. Red crosses represent block
generations. In the first release, there are two retransmissions of the frame
(F), due to failure, in the second release, only one retransmission.
In contrast to the downlink transmissions, we assume that
the transmission of the acknowledgment packet in the uplink
happens instantaneously and is always received reliably, thanks
to power control, performed at the IoT device side, based on
the received transmission.
D. Frame structure
The downlink frame, represented in Fig. 5, consists of F
bits, and is divided into a fixed number H of header bits,
representing the standard communication protocol overhead,
and a variable number D of payload bits, corresponding the
blockchain information, i.e. F = H +D. Its duration is related
to the transmission rate R as
Tw =
kF
R
[s],
where k ≥ 1 is the number of transmissions, including
retransmissions due to outage.
If the transmission of the frame takes longer than the
transmission period, i.e. Tw > T , due to retransmissions, it
is halted and considered failed. In this case, that has been
analyzed in [7], since the block headers are required in order
for the IoT device to stay synchronized to the blockchain,
the next frame should include the block headers accumulated
in the current frame. In this work, we consider the channel
and block generation parameters that provide a negligible
probability that the frame cannot be received in the current
transmission period, so that the phenomenon can be ignored.4
The D payload bits are divided into DH bits for block headers
and DA bits for account updates, i.e. D = DH + DA. DH and
DA are random as they depend on the number of generated
blocks and account updates.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we present an analysis of the aggregation
scheme. To this end, we first obtain the distribution of the
frame size and frame transmission duration, and then use this
result to evaluate the communication cost and latency.
4Scenarios for which this assumption does not hold can be observed when
the probability of outage is rather high, and the transmission rate is low.
A. Frame size distribution
Recall that the frame is divided into H header bits, DH
bits for block headers and DA bits for account states. The H
header bits are fixed, while DH depends on the number of
generated blocks during the aggregation period T , indicated
as B. Similarly, DA depends on the number of generated
blocks, as it impacts the number of observed accounts that
are updated. We indicate the probability distributions of DH
and DA, conditioned on the number of generated blocks,
respectively as pDH |B and pDA |B. As a result, we may factorize
the distribution of the total frame size F as
pF ( f ) =
∞∑
b=0
pB(b)
f∑
i=0
pDH |B(i |b)pDA |B( f − i |b), (2)
where we have used the fact that f = DH + DA. The possible
sizes are conditioned on the event that b blocks are generated
during T given by
pB(b) = (λT)
b exp(−λT)
b!
. (3)
The formula directly follows from the assumption of expo-
nential waiting time between blocks, which has been shown
to hold for blockchains based on Proof of Work [26].
1) Distribution of DH: Since we assumed that the block
headers are always received within the current transmission
period, i.e. Tw < T , the size of DH, when B blocks are
generated, can be approximated with the fixed quantity B · lH
bits, yielding pDH |B in (2).
If this is not the case, the number of block headers that
needs to be transmitted should be modeled as a bulk queue,
where blocks arrive according to a Poisson distribution with
rate λ, and are served in bulks of up to
⌈
D
lH
⌉
, where dxe denotes
the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. However, this
makes the accurate analysis intractable and is outside of the
scope for this work.
2) Distribution of DA: In order to obtain the size of the
account updates DA, we first need to characterize the number
of accounts U that are updated during an aggregation period
T . The probability that account j, characterized by relative
frequency pj5, is updated at least once in b blocks accumulated
during the aggregation period is given by qj = 1−(1−pj)b . We
denote by U the total number of accounts that are modified at
least once in B blocks. Since each of the accounts is updated
independently conditioned on B, U follows a Poisson binomial
distribution parameterized by the account update probabilities
q1, q2, . . . , q |A |:
pU |B(u|b) =
∑
B∈Fu
∏
j∈B
qj
∏
l∈Fu\B
(1 − ql) . (4)
Fu is the set of all subsets of {1, 2, . . . , |A|} with cardinality
u, B is an element of Fu and Fu \ B is the complement of
B. This distribution is used to find the distribution of DA,
conditioned on B:
pDA |B(a|b) =
|A |∑
u=0
pDA |U,B(a|u, b) · pU |B(u|b). (5)
5This quantity is not assumed but experimentally estimated in Sec. V.
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Notice that pDA |U,B(a|u, b) only depends on the realization
of the number of modified accounts u. This permits us to write
pDA |U,B(a|u, b) = pDA |U (a|u)
=
a∑
i=0
plPoMI |U (i |u)placc |U (a − i |u). (6)
To complete the analysis, we need to characterize the size of
PoMI and accounts’ information. The size of accounts’ infor-
mation varies only with the number U of modified accounts,;
as in our model they have fixed size of la, this size is simply
lacc = U · la bit. On the other hand, the PoMI length lPoMI does
not only depend on the number of observed accounts, but also
on their position in the state tree. For simplicity, we assume
that the tree is perfectly balanced at all levels, and that the
location of the observed accounts at the last level is uniformly
distributed. The approximation is supported by the fact that
Patricia trees are generally well-balanced [27].
However, the fact that the number of proofs that each
node can be part of is bounded by the number of descendant
leaf nodes, makes the problem of obtaining the distribution
of the number of nodes in the PoMI a hard combinatorial
problem; even the expected value of the number of nodes is
computationally intractable to obtain. Instead, we approximate
the number of nodes by relaxing this condition. The resulting
approximation captures the characteristics of the PoMI size as
the number of modified accounts grows, and is accurate as
long as the number of modified accounts is much lower than
the total number of leaf nodes in the tree. This is typically
the case, as the set of observed accounts is small. Specifically,
relaxation results in the following recursive approximation of
the expected number of nodes in a PoMI for u accounts, when
the tree has height η:
N¯η(u) =
η∑
h=1
LN¯h−1(u)
(
1 − 1
LN¯h−1(u)
)u
, (7)
with N¯0(u) = 1. The derivation is given in Appendix A.
To obtain the expected number of bits for a PoMI, we
assume that the tree does not contain extension nodes, as they
have variable size, see [22]. Hence, with this approximation,
the internal nodes are only branch nodes. Indicated the size
of the output of the hash function with ls, each internal node
has fixed size of ls bits. Instead, the leaf nodes are composed
by a key and a value, see Sec. II, both containing hash values,
resulting in a fixed size of 2 · ls bits. In conclusion, we obtain
the expected number of bits required for a PoMI of u accounts:
l¯PoMI(u) = lsN¯η(u) + u(2 · ls). (8)
B. Transmission duration
The total transmission duration Tw depends on F and the
number of (re)transmissions that is needed before the packet
is successfully received by the IoT device.
A frame is transmitted successfully with probability 1−pout,
independent of the size of the frame, and hence the number of
transmissions is geometrically distributed with the probability
mass function
Pr(k transmissions) = pk−1out (1 − pout). (9)
Since the rate remains fixed across (re)transmissions, it follows
that the probability density function of Tw is
pTw (t) =
∞∑
k=1
pF
( t
k
R
)
Pr(k transmissions) (10)
= (1 − pout)
∞∑
k=1
pF
( t
k
R
)
pk−1out . (11)
C. Data savings of the aggregation protocol
Since the states of accounts can be verified from the
state tree root contained in the most recent block header,
the aggregation scheme provides data savings by (i) sending
a unique PoMI that certifies only the latest state of the
modified accounts, (ii) sending only the most updated copy
of the account data structure, and (iii) reducing the amount
of frame overhead, H. We consider protocol P2 from [7]
introduced in Sec. II-C as the benchmark. Recall that P2
requires the device to download the following information at
each block period: the frame overhead H, a notification of
the new block from each peer, the block header, the PoMI
and the account data structures. In addition, with P2, the
device receives a notification of new block, indicated as “Block
ready” in Fig. 4(a), from each BN, and consequently selects
a BN with uplink message, indicated as “Block request” in
the same figure. However, to establish a fair comparison with
the aggregation protocol, we assume that the BN, in charge
of sending the update, is pre-selected via random seed also in
P2, removing the need of these messages.
The expected amount of bits downloaded with protocol P2
during a block period is
E
[
F(P2)
]
= H + P = H + lH +
∞∑
a=0
a · pDA |B(a|1). (12)
The expression is based on (5), and on the fact that exactly
one block is generated during a block period.
The expected number of bits per block period downloaded
using the aggregation protocol proposed in this paper is given
by averaging (2):
E[F] = 1
λ · T
∞∑
f=0
f · pF ( f ), (13)
where λ · T is the expected number of blocks within the
aggregation period. We can now express the savings of the
aggregation protocol as
Γ =1 − E[F]
E
[
F(P2)
] = (14)
=1 −
∑∞
f=0 f · pF ( f )
λ · T · (H + lH +∑∞a=0 a · pDA |B(a|1)) . (15)
V. EVALUATION
To validate our model and show the performance of the
aggregation scheme, we have modified the Python implemen-
tation of Ethereum protocol, PyEthereum [28]. The system,
parametrized as listed in Table I, includes a randomly gener-
ated blockchain. This is obtained by generating accounts that
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TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Blockchain
λ 0.1 s−1 H 1200 lH 4046 bit
la 320 kb ls 256 bit L 16
η 5
Communication channel
R 250 kbit/s W 180 kHz γ 30 dB
contain random information, with size la bits, and inserting
them in a newly initialized blockchain database. For the
statistical characterization of accounts updates, we take as
reference the Ethereum main network as described in the
following section.
A. Statistical characterization of accounts updates
The statistics of account updates plays a fundamental role
in the design and evaluation of blockchain protocols. We base
our evaluation on the Ethereum main network dataset [29],
by analyzing the activity during blocks numbered from 5.1
to 6.4 million. Fig. 6 shows the frequency of updates of
the 104 most updated accounts, indexed in descending order
of their updates frequencies. To extract this metric, we do
not distinguish between transactions from/to the accounts, or
consider if there are multiple transaction involving one account
in the same block. We model the relative frequency of updates
of account j according to the broken power-law:
pj =
{
α1 jα2 if j ≤ α3,
αα2−α43 α1 j
α4 otherwise.
We opt for this function, instead of the plain power-law,
adopted e.g. in [30], [31], because the most frequent accounts
are associated to web services that provide currency exchanges
and are updated at similar rates. The least squares fit gives
α1 = 0.63, α2 = −0.37, α3 = 21, α4 = −0.79. This
function, also shown in Fig. 6, is used to generate the relative
frequencies for our “synthetic” blockchain in the evaluation.
In addition to obtaining the account update probabilities,
we inspect the accuracy of modelling the number of blocks
between two account updates as a geometric distribution as
assumed in our model. We compare the empirical cumulative
density function (CDF) of an account, j, to the CDF of a
geometric distribution with parameter pj . Fig. 7 shows the
results obtained for some accounts of the data set. It results that
the assumption only holds for frequently updated accounts.
This behaviour should be taken into account in future works.
B. Validation of Merkle-Patricia proofs length
Since the analysis of the length of a Merkle-Patricia proof is
based on the assumption that the tree is perfectly balanced, the
analysis is validated by comparing analytical results both to
numerical results obtained from a perfectly balanced tree, and
to measurements obtained from the Merkle-Patricia tree im-
plementation in PyEthereum, which is in general unbalanced,
see Fig. 8. In particular, Fig. 8(a) compares the analytical
expression for the average number of nodes that compose a
100 101 102 103 104
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Our model
Ethereum main network
Fig. 6. Relative frequency of updates for the most active accounts, in log-log
scale.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of empirical CDF of accounts (represented with crosses),
with index j, with the CDF of geometrical distribution (represented with dots).
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Fig. 8. Comparison of analytical approximation, numerical and experimental
results for the (a) number of nodes needed in the PoMI and (b) its length.
PoMI with the experimental data obtained from PyEthereum
and with numerical results. The results show that the analytical
expression fits the numerical results obtained for a balanced
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Fig. 9. Probability distribution of the number of nodes in a PoMI, for different
number of observed events u, obtained via experiment.
tree; at the same time, it overestimates the average number
of nodes, needed for a PoMI, in the Ethereum system. This
follows from the fact that the average depth of leaves in a
Patricia tree is greater than in a balanced tree [27], implying
that some internal levels might not be completely populated,
hence the slight reduction in number of nodes needed for
the PoMI. Fig. 8(b) compares the length of the PoMI. For
the numerical and analytical results, each node is represented
by the corresponding hash value, while for the experimental
data the PoMI data structure is represented with Recursive
Length Prefix (RLP) [15]. The RLP also contains information
about the structure of the tree, therefore introducing a small
overhead. For this reason, the length for the experimental data
is slightly larger than the ones of the numerical and analytical
results.
The experimental setup also permits to characterize the
distribution of the number of nodes in a PoMI, see Fig. 9,
in which we show the results obtained for a blockchain
with η = 6 levels, completely filled, therefore containing
L6 = 166 accounts, where L is the maximum number of
children of a node. The relative position of the accounts in
the tree clearly impacts the length of their PoMI and, hence,
the communication cost of transmitting them. In addition,
the results provide insights on the consequence of using the
expected length of PoMI, instead of its distribution, in (6).
As the variance of the PoMI distribution remarkably increases
with the number of included accounts, u, the precision of the
approximation is decreased. On the other hand, its contribution
to the total length of the payload, DA, is counterbalanced
by the weight of accounts’ data structure, which becomes
predominant. This is shown in details in the following text.
C. Performance of the aggregation protocol
We consider a scenario in which the device is connected to
BNs via a communication link parameterized as in Table I.
We remark that if the device is solely interested in observing
accounts that are updated sporadically, the aggregation pro-
tocol only provides reduction of the communication overhead
(the frame headers). Therefore, we focus the evaluation on the
case where the device observes active accounts. An account,
j, is considered active if it is updated at least once every T
seconds, with probability PA, i.e.
1 − (1 − pj ) dT/TB e ≥ PA (16)
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Fig. 10. Complementary CDF of Tw for two different intervals.
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Fig. 11. Duty cycle of the device (a) for different values of SNR and (b) for
different rates.
In the rest of the work, we set PA = 0.9. By requesting updates
about more active accounts, than those of actual interest, the
device can increase its privacy, at the cost of downloading
unnecessary information. The application is further discussed
in Sec. V-E.
1) Duty cycle trade-offs: Fig. 10 reports the complementary
CDF of the duration of the transmission, Tw , for two determin-
istic sets of observed accounts: A1 = {1, 2}, that contains the
two most frequently updated ones, and A2 = { j |20 < j ≤ 41},
containing the 20 less active accounts when T = 180 s.6 The
sets are formed to illustrate two interesting limit scenarios.
The probability of channel outage, derived from R and γ of
Table I, is 1.6 · 10−3. The number of observed accounts, and
6According to our definition, see (16), there are 41 active accounts for
T = 180 s and 695 for T = 1800 s.
SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION (2018) 9
H Block Headers PoMI Accounts
100
102
104
106
D
at
a 
am
ou
nt
 [k
bit
s]
P2 T=180 s T=1800 s
Fig. 12. Amount of information downloaded for A3, during 24 hours, for
protocol P2 and for protocol with aggregation with different values of T .
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
T [s]
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Fig. 13. Gain of the aggregation protocol, analytical expression and simula-
tion.
their statistics, clearly plays a central role in shaping the CDF,
as the size of the account data structure is much bigger than
the size of a block header, see Table I.
The study of the duty cycle of the device, reported in
Fig. 11, covers several fundamental trade-offs. Fig. 11(a)
shows that the duty cycle decreases when the channel quality
(SNR) increases, due to the reduced number of retransmis-
sions, and saturates for high values of SNR, as retransmissions
are not likely to happen. A possible strategy that can be
adopted by the IoT device, to reduce its duty cycle, is to update
less frequently, i.e. increase T , or reduce the set of observed
accounts. Fig. 11(b) reports the duty cycle as function of the
transmission rate of the wireless link. At low rates, the duty
cycle of the device is drastically increased. On the other hand,
selecting a high rate causes transmission failures and therefore
retransmissions which become dominant when the rate reaches
a certain level.
2) Communication cost: The rest of the results focuses on
how the different parts of the frame contribute to its total
length and on the aggregation gain, defined in Sec. IV-C.
We construct a set A3 containing |A3 | = 20 accounts,
by randomly selecting among those that are active during
T = 1800 s. It should be noted that A2 is a possible realization
of A3. Fig. 12 shows the amount of information, downloaded
during 24 hours of execution, for different values of T and
different realizations of accounts in A3. In this scenario, there
are no retransmissions; their effect would be a proportional
increase in all the quantities. The figure shows that most of
communication cost is due to the size of the account data
structures, which is an order of magnitude higher w.r.t. the size
of PoMI, and two order of magnitudes higher than the size of
the block headers and communication protocol headers.
The aggregation gain, Γ, is shown in Fig. 13 for several
values of the aggregation period, T , and compared with a
simulation of the system. The figure shows a good match
between the simulation and the analytics, and that the gain
is remarkable, even for small values of T . As T → ∞ the
observed accounts are updated almost surely during a period,
and will be downloaded in the next transmission. This causes
the gain to increase linearly when T is large.
D. Remarks on possibilities to further reduce of the commu-
nication cost
We briefly discuss possible directions for a further reduction
of the communication cost for IoT lightweight clients, based
on the insights provided by the evaluation of the protocol. The
size of the accounts’ data structures has shown a prominent
impact on the amount of transmitted data. This can be reduced
with several approaches, for example (i) by keeping their size
as small as possible, during the design phase of the contract;
(ii) by compressing the account information before sending it;
(iii) by only sending the portion of account structure that has
changed.
A completely different approach is to send the updates
by means of the transactions tree, when the corresponding
accounts are rarely updated. In fact, the size of a transaction
is typically lower than the one of the account. In addition,
while the state tree grows with the number of accounts, the
transactions tree size is limited by the block size. This option,
mentioned in Sec. II-C, has not been considered in this paper,
as it does not provide aggregation gain. Future works can
consider this extension by (i) including in the system model
the statistics of the number of transactions, that modify an
account, in a single block; (ii) considering also the contribution
of the transactions tree to the size of PDA in (5); (iii) finding
a strategy to decide if sending the update under the form of
updated state, or as collection of transactions.
E. Example application: privacy of IoT device
We conclude this section by providing an example appli-
cation of the aggregation protocol. Consider a scenario in
which the IoT device is solely interested in observing one
(active) account, indexed as j?. However, to keep j? private,
it requests updates about additional accounts, in which it is
not interested, from BNs (privacy by obfuscation) [14]. A
malicious BN is aware that the IoT device is interested in
one account and applies an outlier detection technique to find
it. In the presented model, the only feature available to the
BN is the relative frequency of update of accounts. For both
sides (device and BN), it is reasonable to assume that the set
of observed accounts, indicated as A4, only contains active
accounts, since non active accounts would be excluded by the
outlier detection.
Based on these considerations, the IoT device constructs
A4 by adding j? and other random active accounts. The
construction starts with A4 = { j?}, then |A4 | is iteratively
incremented. At each iteration, the set of active accounts is
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split in |A4 | segments and one account is randomly picked
from each segment ( j? is always picked among the accounts
in its segment). The iteration is repeated until the tolerated
communication cost, expressed by (13), is reached. Finally,A4
is sent to the BN. There is a trade-off between the delay, given
by the aggregation protocol, and privacy, i.e. |A4 |. This trade-
off is shown in Fig. 14, for different tolerated communication
costs E[F], and j? = 41 (that is an active account). A further
improvement, not implemented in this paper, is impose that
accounts in A4 should be located in proximity of each other in
the state tree. In fact, this provides shorter PoMI and therefore
lower communication cost, see Fig. 9.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated what is the communi-
cation cost of sending blockchain information to Ethereum-
like lightweight clients. A novel aggregation scheme has been
proposed that has the potential to obtain a lower commu-
nication cost, at the expense of higher information delay,
or availability of information, at the application layer. The
analysis of the scheme showed the probability distributions of
the data structures exchanged over the wireless link, and their
impact on the total downlink budget.
Finally, the results show that, if the statistics of account
updates and the channel state are known, the lightweight
clients can construct a list of events of interest that provides
a predictable average communication cost. The example ap-
plication illustrated how to apply our findings to improve
the privacy of IoT devices. The guidelines presented in this
paper can be applied to design more advanced blockchain
lightweight protocols.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF NODES IN A
POMI
Under the relaxation described in Sec. IV, the probability
that an arbitrary node at level h is ancestor to one of u
modified leaf nodes (denoted by the binary random variable
Xh) is Pr(Xh = 1|Nh−1 = nh−1,U = u) = (1 − 1/(Lnh−1))u ,
where Nh−1 is the number of nodes at level h − 1 that are
ancestors to a modified leaf node and L is the branching
factor of the tree. Since Xh is a binary random variable,
EXh [Xh |Nh−1 = nh−1,U = u] = Pr(Xh = 1|Nh−1 = nh−1,U =
u), and the expected total number of ancestor nodes at level
h is ENh [Nh |Nh−1 = nh−1,U = u] = Lnh−1 · EXh [Xh |Nh−1 =
nh−1,U = u]. By the law of total expectation,
ENh [Nh |U = u] = ENh−1
[
ENh [Nh |Nh−1,U = u] |U = u
]
= ENh−1
[
LNh−1 · EXh [Xh |Nh−1,U = u] |U = u
]
= ENh−1
[
LNh−1 ·
(
1 − 1
LNh−1
)u  U = u] .
By applying a first-order Taylor expansion at ENh−1 [Nh−1 |U =
u] we obtain
ENh [Nh |U = u] ≈ (17)
L ENh−1 [nh−1 |U = u]
(
1 − 1
LENh−1 [nh−1 |U = u]
)u
.
Denoting N¯h(u) = ENh [Nh |U = u] and using the fact that the
PoMI will always contain a single root to define N¯0(u) = 1,
(17) can be obtained by recursion. The approximated number
of nodes for a complete PoMI, in a tree of height η, is the
sum of the nodes required at each level which yields (7):
N¯η(u) =
η∑
h=1
N¯h(u).
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